Qamar Bashir
Israel’s October 27 general election has delivered a significant political setback to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,whose campaign emphasized military strength, national security and confrontation with Iran. Yet the voters have not handed his principal opponent, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, an unambiguous mandate either. Instead, Israel faces a fragmented parliament, difficult coalition negotiations and potentially prolonged political uncertainty, with consequences extending far beyond its borders.
The initial exit polls projected approximately 50 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc, 52–53 for Eisenkot’s opposition alliance and17–18 for Arab-led parties. Updated projections narrowed the contest further, placing the two principal blocs at approximately 51 seats each. Neither approaches the 61 seats required for a majority in the 120-member Knesset. These remain provisional projections, not final election results.
The election represents more than a contest between two political personalities. It is a referendum on Netanyahu’s wartime leadership, Israel’s democratic institutions, the October 7 intelligence failures, military conscription, relations with Palestinians and the future direction of Israeli foreign policy. High voter participation, particularly among Arab citizens, suggests that substantial sections of Israeli society want their voices heard in determining that direction.
Netanyahu’s political predicament is particularly complicated because his traditional allies include ultranationalist and religious parties whose positions on Palestinian territory, settlement expansion and military operations are frequently more uncompromising than those of the broader Israeli electorate. Parties associated with Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have advocated extensive Israeli control over Palestinian territories, while ultra-Orthodox parties prioritize religious institutions, public funding and military-service exemptions.
These factions should not be treated as ideologically identical. Nevertheless, another Netanyahu-led government dependent on their parliamentary support could face intensified demands for settlement expansion, restrictions onPalestinian sovereignty and continued military pressure across the region. Coalition negotiations might therefore reinforce rather than moderate some of the policies that have generated international criticism.
The consequences would extend to Gaza, where Israel’s military campaign has caused enormous civilian suffering, destruction and displacement. International institutions and human-rights organizations have raised grave allegations concerning violations of international humanitarian law. Netanyahu rejects accusations of criminal wrongdoing and maintains that Israel’s operations are necessary for national security and the defeat of Hamas.
In the occupied West Bank, continued settlement expansion and settler violence have undermined prospects forPalestinian self-determination. In southern Lebanon, Israeli security operations and demands for buffer arrangements have raised serious questions about Lebanese sovereignty. The occupied Syrian Golan Heights remains another longstanding territorial dispute, notwithstanding Israel’s annexation claim and American recognition of Israeli sovereignty there.
Iran represents perhaps the most dangerous dimension of Netanyahu’s regional strategy. His political message has consistently presented Tehran as an existential security threat, requiring military preparedness and, when deemed necessary, offensive action. His critics contend that an escalating confrontation risks drawing the United States into an increasingly costly regional conflict while destabilizing neighboring countries and threatening international energy supplies.
An Eisenkot-led administration could alter the methods through which Israel pursues its security objectives, although it would not necessarily abandon those objectives. Eisenkot, himself a former military chief, also considers Iran a major strategic threat and supports strong Israeli military capabilities. His distinction from Netanyahu lies more in his emphasis on institutional accountability, national cohesion, coordinated security policy and rebuilding international partnerships than in any categorical rejection of military force.
His proposed independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, attacks could become particularly consequential. Such an investigation would examine the intelligence, military and political failures that allowed Hamas militants to breach Israel’s defenses, kill civilians and security personnel, and take hostages.
Serious questions have been raised about whether Israeli authorities adequately assessed warnings preceding the attack,why border defenses proved insufficient and how political and military decision-making contributed to the catastrophe.There have also been investigations and disputes concerning Israeli fire during the fighting. These questions deserve independent examination, with responsibility established through evidence rather than political accusation.
However, allegations that Netanyahu deliberately facilitated the Hamas attack to justify territorial expansion, or thatIsraeli forces caused most of the deaths, have not been established by credible evidence. An independent inquiry would be important precisely because it could distinguish documented institutional failures from speculation, determine individual accountability and restore public confidence in the findings.
For Palestinians, an Eisenkot government might offer greater scope for negotiations over Gaza’s reconstruction, civilian administration and the prevention of further displacement. Proposals involving Palestinian technocrats and international participation could provide alternatives to indefinite Israeli military administration. Yet Eisenkot’s security-centered outlook does not automatically translate into support for full Palestinian sovereignty or immediate Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.
A settlement freeze, stronger action against extremist settler violence and renewed diplomatic engagement would constitute meaningful changes if implemented. But a durable settlement would still require confronting the fundamental questions of occupation, borders, Palestinian political rights, security guarantees and internationally recognized self-determination.
The Arab-led parties may therefore become the election’s most consequential parliamentary actors. Ra’am, led byMansour Abbas, has previously demonstrated willingness to participate in coalition arrangements, while other Arab political factions have generally maintained stronger opposition to Israeli policies toward Palestinians. Their combined representation could be indispensable to preventing Netanyahu’s return or sustaining an alternative administration.
Yet Eisenkot’s prospective coalition contains secular right-wing politicians who oppose governing alongside Arab parties.This creates a fundamental contradiction: the opposition may possess sufficient combined parliamentary strength to replace Netanyahu, but not the political agreement necessary to exercise that strength. Outside parliamentary support, a minority administration or carefully negotiated confidence arrangements could become possible solutions.
Even a successfully constituted government would confront an uphill struggle. A narrow parliamentary base could allow relatively small factions to threaten legislation, budgets and coalition survival. Disagreements over military conscription,religious privileges, judicial independence and Palestinian policy could destabilize the administration before its regional diplomatic initiatives acquire momentum.
Should neither political camp assemble a workable governing arrangement, Israel could enter another prolonged cycle of negotiations, failed mandates and potentially fresh elections. Under Israel’s parliamentary system and Basic Laws, the outgoing government generally continues in a caretaker capacity until a replacement takes office. Netanyahu could therefore remain prime minister despite losing his existing parliamentary majority.
Such uncertainty would have consequences for Washington, European capitals, Tehran, Beirut, Damascus and thePalestinian territories. Governments would struggle to determine whether Israeli military commitments, diplomatic assurances and regional policies represented temporary political calculations or the enduring direction of the state.
Ultimately, the election has exposed the limitations of relying exclusively on military power to address deeply rooted political disputes. Israel’s security concerns are real, as are Palestinian demands for freedom, dignity and statehood and neighboring countries’ rights to sovereignty and territorial integrity. None can be permanently resolved through force alone.
The central question is therefore not simply whether Netanyahu survives or Eisenkot replaces him. It is whether Israel’s next government, whatever its composition, can reconcile security with international law, accountability with democratic governance, and national interests with regional coexistence.
Israel’s electoral verdict remains incomplete, but its message is unmistakably complex: political power is fragmented, public confidence is contested, and the choice between continued confrontation and meaningful diplomacy remains unresolved. The Middle East now awaits not merely the formation of another Israeli government, but an indication of whether that government can open a credible path toward peace.
The writer is Press Secretary to the President (Rtd), Former Press Minister, Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former Press Attaché to Malaysia and Former MD, SRBC . He is living in Michigan, USA
